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	(CA☐)	☐(D(S,M)x↔Sx☐àMx),	where	CA	is	the	acronym	of	‘conditional	analysis’	and	D(S,M)x’	symbolises	‘x	is	disposed	to	manifest	M	in	response	to	stimulus	S’.		Being	a	potency,	property	P	is	such	that		(DEP)	☐(Px	àD(S,M)x)		That	is,	the	real	essence	of	P	is	its	power	to	give	characteristic	manifestation	M	under	stimulus	conditions	S.		Now,	(CA☐)	and	(DEP)	yield		(I) ☐(Pxà(Sx☐àMx))	 	Assume	a	world	w	in	which	some	object	x	possesses	P	and	in	which	x	also	acquires	stimulus	S.	In	w		 (II) Px	&	Sx.		(I)	and	(II)	yield			(III) Mx		Hence,		 (IV)(Px&Sx)àMx	Hence,		 (V)	∀x	((Px&Sx)àMx)		 That’s	a	neat	derivation	of	a	qualitative	generalisation.	Being	thus,	it	fails	to	show	how	quantitative-mathematical	relations	among	properties	‘flow’	from	their	dispositional	essences.	(V)	above	states	that	the	property	P	and	the	stimulus	S	lead	to	the	manifestation	M,	but	it	does	not	necessarily	capture	the	relation	among	the	three	elements.	In	particular,	it	does	not	capture	the	quantitative	relation	between	the	property	(qua	quantity)	and	its	manifestation.	Hence,	as	Vetter	(2012,	209-15)	pointed	out,	Bird’s	derivation	cannot	actually	describe	physics’	functional	laws	among	quantities.	As	an	example,	she	referred	to	Coulomb’s	law	for	the	interaction	of	point	charged	particles.	Here	is	how	Vetter	(2009,	325)	put	the	point:	“Like	most	(all?)	fundamental	laws	of	physics,	Coulomb’s	Law	states	not	merely	a	relation	between	properties,	but	a	very	special	kind	of	relation	–	namely,	a	mathematical	function	–	between	properties	of	a	very	special	kind	–	namely,	quantities.	(V),	on	the	other	hand,	states	a	much	simpler,	non-mathematical	relation	between	properties	that	look	rather	like	qualities”.	Could	the	advocate	of	dispositional	essentialism	argue	that	powers	are	(fully)	determinate?	That	is,	that	Coulomb’s	law	refers	to	the	power	of	charge	of	specific	value	Q	to	attract	or	repel	other	charges	of	specific	values?	The	‘law’	then	would	be:	Everything	that	has	charge	Q	thus-and-so	and	is	in	specific	distance	r	will	manifest	a	specific	force	F.	But	this	is	not	Coulomb’s	law.	It	is	totally	unclear	what	exactly	all	similar	instances	have	in	common	in	virtue	of	which	they	could	be	taken	to	be	instances	of	Coulomb’s	law.		
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	 Vetter	suggests	an	alternative	formulation	of	the	characterisation	of	charge	that	is	open	to	the	dispositional	essentialist:		(I+)	☐	(x	has	charge	e	à	∀	charges	qi	∀distances	ri	(x	is	at	ri	from	qi	☐à	x	exerts	force		Fi	= 𝜀 !!!!!!  	)		 This	reformulation,	as	Vetter	notes,	differs	from	Bird’s	initial	formulation	(I)	in	that	the	stimulus	and	the	manifestation	of	the	disposition	cannot	be	characterised	independently	of	each	other:	if	we	specify	the	manifestation	as	the	force	given	by	Coulomb’s	law,	we	have	to	specify	qi	and	ri,	which	however	are	part	of	the	stimulus.	Vetter’s	suggestion	is	to	understand	(I+)	in	terms	of	a	manifestation	only:	‘the	exertion	of	a	force	that	stands	in	a	certain	correlation	to	certain	features	of	the	environment’	(327).	While	(I+)	has	the	advantage	over	(I)	that	it	can	be	used	to	derive	Coulomb’s	law,	rather	than	instances	of	Coulomb’s	law	(as	in	Bird’s	case),	there	is	a	crucial	problem	with	both	derivations,	and,	we	submit,	with	all	similar	kinds	of	proposed	derivation	of	Coulomb’s	law	as	well	as	other	laws	in	physics	that	specify	relations	among	quantities.	As	Cartwright	and	Pemberton	(2013)	have	noted,	dispositional	essentialists	are	committed	to	the	view	that	(at	least	some)	powers	have	a	‘dense’	causal	profile,	that	is	that	the	power	has	it	within	itself	that	it	will	manifest	itself	in	a	certain	concrete	way	for	each	and	every	value	of	its	manifestation	partners,	where	this	set	of	values	may	be	infinite.	So	for	instance,	if	the	electrostatic	force	Fi	= ε !!!!!!!  	is	the	manifestation	of	charges	given	the	inverse	square	of	the	distance	between	them,	as	in	Coulomb’s	law,	then	the	power	of	the	charge	qi	to	attract	or	repel	other	charges	qj	is	fixed	for	all	values	of	qi	and	qj	and	all	the	values	ri	of	the	distance	between	the	charges,	where	ri	takes	its	value	from	the	interval	 0,∞ .	So,	even	if	adoption	of	(I+)	allows	Coulomb’s	law	to	be	derived	and	shows	how	Coulomb’s	law	is	fixed	by	the	power	of	the	charge,	the	price	to	pay	would	be	quite	steep,	as	such	a	view	of	powers	is	unnecessarily	complex.		Cartwright	and	Pemberton’s	own	suggestion	is	to	think	of	the	manifestation	of	a	power	in	terms	of	a	‘canonical	effect’	or	a	‘contribution’	that	the	power	makes	in	different	circumstances.	Such	a	view	has	the	advantage	of	avoiding	the	complexity	of	the	‘causal	profile’	account.	But	when	we	consider	how	such	a	view	treats	a	law	that	specifies	relations	among	quantities,	such	as	Coulomb’s	law,	the	problem	remains:	what	determines	what	will	happen	in	each	different	situation,	i.e.	how	the	various	contributions	of	the	powers	will	be	combined,	such	as	Coulomb’s	law	will	be	satisfied?	It	would	seem	that	we	need	laws	of	combination	of	the	various	contributions	(for	instance,	the	parallelogram-law	for	the	addition	of	component	forces	or	more	complex	tensorial	laws)	in	order	to	explain	the	occurrence	of	specific	effects.	And	it	seems	that	these	laws,	like	the	conservation	laws	that	we	will	discuss	in	the	next	section,	cannot	flow	from	the	nature	of	powers.	Thus,	the	‘contribution’	view	seems	to	strengthen	our	point	for	the	indispensability	of	laws.4	
																																																						4	Cartwright	and	Pemberton	acknowledge	this,	when	they	say:	“[i]t	might	be	objected	that	the	account	of	powers	we	offer	does	not	eliminate	the	need	for	laws	of	nature	since	it	still	leaves	need	for	rules	of	combination	that	are	independent	of	the	powers	in	nature.	So	that	unlike	some	other	powers	accounts,	we	may	not	have	succeeded	in	getting	governance	back	in	to	nature.	We	concede	that	this	may	be	so.	There	may	be	ways	to	get	rules	for	combining	powers	into	nature	itself	in	a	way	that	fits	a	pure	powers	ontology	and	there	may	not.	This	remains	work	for	the	future”	(2013,	94-95).	Note	also	that	our	point	that	powers	cannot	account	on	their	own	for	the	nomological	structure	of	the	world	holds,	as	far	as	we	
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certain	quantities;	in	other	words,	conservation	laws	‘flow’	from	the	kind-essence	of	the	actual	world.	Bigelow	et	al.,	most	probably	in	order	to	avoid	the	accusation	of	ad	hocness,	appeal	to	the	world-as-one-of-a-kind	view	to	provide	a	covering	explanation	for	the	emergence	of	all	laws	of	nature.	They	claim	that,	if	conservation	laws	arise	out	of	the	essence	of	the	whole	world,	and	granting	that	conservation	laws	differ	from	the	other	ones	only	in	scope,	then	other	laws	(concerning	parts	of	the	world)	must	also	arise	out	of	the	world-essence.	Moreover,	they	suggest	that	the	essences	of	parts	of	the	world,	and	the	connections	which	depend	on	them,	may	both	contribute	to	the	world-essence;	and	only	insofar	as	they	do	that,	can	laws	of	nature	arise	out	of	them	(cf.	1992,	386–7).	Yet,	if	that	is	true,	the	world-essence	explanation	is	at	least	redundant	as	far	as	the	case	of	non-conservation	laws	is	concerned.	Since	Bigelow	et	al.	have	presumably	already	provided	an	explanation	of	non-conservation	laws	as	emanating	from	particular	kind-essences,	what	more	(besides,	of	course,	escaping	the	ad	hoc-ness	charge)	can	the	global,	coarse-grained,	explanation	in	terms	of	the	world-essence	offer?		Another	version	of	the	view	under	consideration	is	provided	by	Bird	(2007,	213–4).	He	suggests	(without	finally	endorsing)	that	conservation	laws	could	‘flow’	from	the	dispositional	essence	of	the	property	being	a	world	which	the	actual	world	definitely	instantiates.	This	metaphysical	explanation,	however,	is	either	ad	hoc	or	poor.	It	is	ad	hoc	if	the	property	being	a	world	is	posited	only	in	order	to	explain	conservation	facts.	For	the	actual	world	must	have	the	property	of	being	a	world	with	conservation	laws,	that	is	a	world	like	ours!	But	suppose	that	positing	the	property	of	being	a	world	is	meant	to	provide	an	explanation	of	all	worldly	facts.	It	would	then	be	a	poor	explanation	since	it	would	not	be	fine-grained	explanation	of	the	various	types	of	laws	that	obtain	in	the	world.			 The	second	challenge	is	this:	how	can	the	advocates	of	PL	provide	a	plausible	unified	metaphysical	explanation	of	the	phenomenon	of	conservation	in	general	if	they	were	to	reject	(for	the	reasons	given	above)	the	accounts	offered	by	Bigelow	et	al.,	and	Bird?	The	problem	is	that	conservation	applies	to	many	different	physical	properties	that	seem	to	have	nothing	in	common	except	of	the	‘feature’	of	being	a	physical	property.	So,	if	we	reject	a	world-nature	that	in	a	sense	can	unify	the	various	conservation	laws,	it	is	not	clear	on	what	grounds	(that	is,	on	the	nature	of	which	property)	can	the	advocates	of	PL	provide	a	bottom-up	explanation	of	the	phenomenon	of	conserved	quantities.			Lastly,	there	is	a	third,	and	more	general,	challenge	that	conservation	laws	pose	for	PL-ists.	Consider	an	interaction	between	two	charged	particles.	Since	charge	is	conserved,	the	characterisation	of	such	an	interaction	requires	a	relevant	conservation	law.	So,	given	that	the	conservation	law	does	not	‘flow’	from	the	essence	of	charge	(which,	as	characterised	by	the	dispositional	essentialist	is	a	property	of	individual	particles),	nor	from	the	essence	of	the	relevant	natural	kind	(as	Bigelow	et	al.	acknowledge),	the	behaviour	of	the	charged	particles	is	grounded	on	two	things:	the	dispositional	essence	of	charge	(assuming	that	it	has	one)	and	the	law	of	conservation	of	charge.5		That’s	a	key	point.	For	whether	or	not	we	accept	the	further	claim	that	conservation	laws	‘flow’	from	the	world-essence,	it	follows	forcefully	that	these	laws	have	a	governing	
																																																						5	The	intertwinement	of	interaction	laws	with	conservation	laws	can	be	also	brought	to	the	fore	by	the	approximate	conservation	of	flavour	quantum	numbers	of	elementary	particles.	It	is	well	known	that	quantum	numbers	such	as	strangeness,	charm	or	beauty	that	characterise	types	of	elementary	particles	are	preserved	under	strong	and	electromagnetic	interactions,	but	not	under	weak	interaction.	This	fact	clearly	suggests	that	a	complete	characterisation	of,	say,	strong	interaction	and	its	differences	with	weak	interaction	cannot	be	provided	without	reference	to	the	conservation	laws	of	those	quantum	numbers.	
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scientific	laws	which	are	typically	complex	and	in	mathematical	and	quantitative	form.	To	be	sure,	Armstrong	(1983)	has	made	an	effort	to	bring	his	account	nearer	to	actual	scientific	cases.	Yet,	it	is	not	clear	whether	ADT	(based,	as	it	is,	on	a	few	kinds	of	nomic	relations—nomic	necessitation,	nomic	probabilification,	and	perhaps	nomic	exclusion)	can	capture	the	complexity	of	scientific	laws.	How	about	primitivism	then?	Does	it	offer	a	solution	for	the	Governing	Problem?	Primitivism	about	laws	takes	it	that	laws	are	real,	but	ultimate	and	primitive	constituents	of	reality,	which	hold	with	irreducible	necessity	and	guide	the	kinematical	and	dynamical	behaviour	of	worldly	entities	(Carroll	1994;	Lange	2009;	Maudlin	2007)9.	So,	primitivism	tries	to	solve	the	Governing	Problem	by	taking	the	modal	force	of	laws,	and	thus	their	governing	role,	as	given.	But,	by	insisting	that	laws	are	sui	generis	entities,	primitivism	fails	to	give	an	illuminating	account	about	how	laws	‘guide’	the	behaviour	of	worldly	things.	Carroll	(1987,	267),	for	instance,	denies	that	law-statements	have	truth-makers,	and	refrains	from	any	further	analysis	of	the	supposed	facts	(either	nomic	or	non-nomic)	that	are	the	truth-makers	of	laws.	All	he	says	is	the	following:	P	is	a	law	of	nature	if	and	only	if	P	is	a	regularity	that	holds	because	of	nature.	Hence,	“[l]awhood	requires	that	nature	itself–understood	as	distinct	from	anything	in	nature	or	the	absence	of	something	from	nature–make	the	regularity	true”.	That,	we	submit,	is	totally	unilluminating.	For	one,	all	laws	are	‘made	true’	by	nature.	But	which	laws	and	why	are	made	true	thus?	For	another,	Armstrong	once	said	that	we	must	admit	the	existence	of	nomic	necessity	“in	the	spirit	of	natural	piety”	(1983,	92).	Yet,	he	went	on	to	say	a	lot	more	by	way	of	analysis.	Carroll’s	treatment	of	nomic	necessity	as	primitive	just	calls	us	to	be	pious,	without	even	trying	to	explain	to	us	why	we	should.10	The	Governing	Problem	is	then	a	challenge	inherent	in	all	versions	of	LP,	and	is	extremely	important	from	a	metaphysical	point	of	view:	LP	seems	unable	to	provide	a	metaphysical	account	of	how	and	why	properties	are	governed	(in	the	sense	explained	
																																																						9	Marc	Lange	(2009)	has	developed	the	view	that	laws	are	maximal	sets	of	principles	which	are	invariant-under-counterfactual-interventions,	but	since	he	takes	counterfactuals	as	having	a	primitive	modal	force,	his	view	could	be	taken	as	a	variant	of	primitivism.	10	Ontic	structuralists	offer	yet	another	version	of	LP.	Structuralism	reconceptualises	laws	as	being	the	ultimate	structural	features	of	reality	grounded	in	determinable	relations,	where	relations	are	understood	as	not	being	dependent	on	the	first-order	properties	of	objects	(Ladyman	&	Ross	2007;	French	2014).	Ontic	structuralism	then	does	away	with	properties	as	fundamental	and	recovers	them	from	relations.	In	particular,	properties	are	recovered	from	the	relations	embodied	in	the	laws.	Objects	too,	insofar	as	they	are	allowed	in	some	sense,	depend	on	laws.	As	French	sums	it	up:	“the	purported	objects	are	dependent	on	the	structures	(and	here	the	role	of	symmetries	in	presenting	that	dependence	is	fundamental)	and	the	properties	are	dependent	on	the	laws	themselves”	(2014,	302).	The	relation	of	metaphysical	dependence	that	French	favours,	is	the	relation	between	determinable	and	determinates:	“(…)	the	nature	of	the	dependence	between	the	structure	and	kinds,	properties,	and	putative	‘objects’	(e.g.	elementary	particles)	is	shaped,	or	fleshed	out,	by	the	relationship	between	determinables	and	determinates”	(2014,	290).	Laws	themselves	are	“relation-determinables”	(2014,	283)	and	as	such	they	yield	“determinate	instances	of	these	properties”.	We	are	not	going	to	discuss	here	the	idea	for	laws	as	relation-determinables	(for	reasons	to	be	skeptical	with	this	view	see	Psillos	(2016)).	For	our	purposes,	the	main	question	is	whether	there	is	conceptual	space	within	structuralism	for	a	notion	of	‘governing’.	For	Cei	&	French,	for	example,	in	structuralism	the	‘governing	metaphor’	is	replaced	by	the	relation	of	metaphysical	dependence.	But	in	view	of	such	a	dependence,	it	does	not	seem	to	be	meaningful	to	ask	how	the	structure	governs	the	properties.	And	yet,	Cei	and	French	admit	that	“there	is	still	a	kind	of	governance	(…)	in	that	the	behaviour	of	entities,	both	unobservable,	such	as	electrons,	and	observable	such	as	chairs,	can	be	thought	of	as	‘governed’	by	the	relevant	laws”	(2010,	37).	As	the	resulting	view	of	the	structuralist	account	of	laws	is	far	from	clear,	and	in	particular	as	it	is	not	clear	whether	structuralists	adopt	a	genuine	concept	of	governing	(given	their	thesis	of	metaphysical	dependence	of	entities	and	properties	on	the	structure),	we	will	not	discuss	this	view	further	here.	
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would	have	changed	would	have	been	the	exact	quantitative	relation	among	the	relevant	properties.			 In	light	of	this,	we	may	then	discern	two	possible	grades	of	modal	strength	of	mass:			 	
• Necessarily,	mass	confers	on	the	objects	that	possess	it	the	disposition	to	attract	other	massive	objects	with	the	exact	mathematical	form	of	attraction	determined	by	Newton’s	gravitation	law.		
• Necessarily,	mass	confers	on	the	objects	that	possess	it	the	disposition	to	attract	other	massive	objects.		 The	difference	between	the	two	grades	is	very	important.	Let	us,	for	simplicity,	refer	to	the	power	of	mass	(as	opposed	to	the	powers	of	massive	particulars)	and	note	that	the	two	grades	above	attribute	different	powers	to	mass.	On	the	first	option,	the	attractive	power	of	mass	is	fully	specific;	the	power	is	such	that	the	functional	relationship	that	masses	enter	into	with	other	masses	is	fully	determined	by	the	power.	This,	roughly	put,	is	the	view	of	those	who	think	that	laws	‘flow’	from	powers.	Let’s	call	these	powers	thick.	On	the	second	option,	mass	has	indeed	a	power,	but	it	is	thin.	It’s	not	enough	on	its	own	to	fix	the	quantitative	relations	it	stands	to	other	masses.	What	is	also	required	for	this	is	laws	and	specific	(contingent)	nomic	relations.	Hence	on	the	second	option	mass	has	a	thin	power	which	in	tandem	with	a	nomic	relation	(e.g.,	the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	relation	in	the	actual	world)	attracts	other	masses	with	an	exact	mathematical	form	of	attraction	determined	by	the	contingent	nomic	web	of	each	possible	world	in	which	it	exists.	To	put	the	point	with	a	bit	more	precision,	mass	confers	on	the	objects	that	possess	it	the	generic	disposition	to	attract	other	massive	objects	but	the	exact	functional/mathematical	form	of	the	relation	to	which	massive	objects	stand	(i.e.,	Newton’s	gravitation	law)	is	determined	by	a	web	of	laws.	The	first	option	above,	which	is	adopted	by	PL-ists,	is,	we	think,	wrong-headed.	If	mass	had	such	a	thick	power,	it	would	by	itself	confer	the	completely	determined	disposition	of	attraction	on	the	massive	objects	and	Newton’s	law	would	be	metaphysically	redundant.	And	though	this	might	sound	appealing	to	some	friends	of	powers,	we	have	already	seen	that	such	a	view	is	untenable	given	a)	the	problems	with	deriving	the	functional	laws	from	the	powers	of	individual	objects,	and	b)	the	fact	that	the	all-important	conservation	laws	cannot	be	‘flowing’	out	of	powers	of	individual	objects.	Indeed,	in	Newton’s	case,	the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	relation	does	not	‘flow’	directly	from	the	power	of	mass	to	attract	other	masses.	More	is	needed;	for	instance,	the	law	for	the	force	in	uniform	circular	motion	as	well	as	Newton’s	third	law.		 Why	do	we	take	it	that	the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	relation	is	itself	a	nomic	relation	in	which	masses	enter?	It	is	a	nomic	relation	because	it	is	fixed	by	other	laws.	In	the	case	of	Newtonian	gravity,	the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	relation	is	fixed	by	the	three	laws	of	motion	together	with	Kepler’s	harmonic	law.	In	a	possible	world	in	which	Newton’s	laws	of	motion	do	not	hold,	the	centripetal	forces	would	have	different	measures.	Similarly,	in	a	world	in	which	Newton’s	three	laws	hold,	but	where	the	harmonic	law	didn’t,	centripetal	forces	would	have	different	measures;	hence	masses	would	not	stand	in	the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	relation	with	each	other	and	with	the	centripetal	force.	It	is	our	contention	that	gravity	satisfies	Newton’s	law	in	the	specific	quantitative	way	it	does	in	virtue	of	a)	the	generic	power	mass	has	to	attract	other	masses	and	b)	the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	nomic	relation.	DM,	then,	adopts	the	second	option,	above.		
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nomic	relations	that	are	consistent	with	their	powers.	It	is	a	fact	about	the	actual	world	that	some	properties	tend	to	go	together	while	others	do	not.	Positing	minimal	powers	explains	why	certain	properties	are	apt	to	be	related	by	specific	nomic	relations:	it	is	because	properties	have	minimal	powers	that	they	tend	to	go	together.	Hence,	properties	are	governable	by	laws	because,	due	to	their	thin	powers,	they	tend	to	enter	into	specific	nomic	relations.	But	that’s	not	enough	for	governing,	since	the	nomic	relation,	which	relates	the	thin	powers,	is	external	to	its	relata.	How	then	do	nomic	relations	‘tell’	properties	what	to	do?	The	second	step	then	is	to	think	of	nomic	relations	themselves	as	relata-specific:	nomic	relations	relate	specific	properties12.	Hence,	nomic	relations	are	second-order	relata-specific	relations.	For	instance,	the	nomic	relation	associated	with	Newton’s	gravitational	law	links	two	masses,	the	force	acting	on	each	of	them	and	their	spatial	distance	(and	cannot	link	other	properties/relations).	Newton’s	law	governs	the	behaviour	of	mass	through	this	relata-specific	second-order	relation.	Of	course,	focusing	on	only	one	nomic	relation	is	an	oversimplification.	In	fact,	since	properties	are	usually	relata	of	a	number	of	different	nomic	relations,	it	is	the	network	of	relata-specific	nomic	relations	constituting	the	causal/nomic	role	of	the	property	that	governs	its	behaviour;	nothing	metaphysically	more	informative	could	be	said	about	this	governing.	Simply	put,	to	nomically	govern	a	property	(qua	a	thin	power)	is	simply	to	determine	the	specific	form	of	the	second-order	relata-specific	relations	that	this	property	bears	to	other	properties13.		 Here	is	an	objection	to	this	point.	Consider	Coulomb’s	law.	It	is	a	force	law,	which,	like	the	gravitation	law,	embodies	an	inverse-square-of-the-distance	relation	but	it	relates	charges	instead	of	masses.	Intuitively,	the	‘inverse-square-of-the-distance’	nomic	relation	is	the	same	in	the	two	laws,	the	only	difference	being	that	the	relata	are	different.	Do	we	want	to	say	that	these	two	laws	embody	the	same	nomic	relation	with	different	relata?	In	that	case,	however,	nomic	relations	cannot	be	relata-specific.	This	objection	presupposes	that	nomic	relations	should	be	metaphysically	construed	as	‘function-like’	entities	with	‘slots’	to	be	filled	by	properties.	So	for	instance,	the	kind	‘inverse-square-of-the-distance’	nomic	relation	has	the	form	F	=	(slot	1).(slot	2)/r2	where	specific	properties	(masses,	charges)	are	substituted	for	the	slots.	There	are	two	ways	to	reply	to	this	objection.	The	first	is	to	note	that	even	if	we	granted	the	existence	of	slots,	it	would	still	not	follow	that	the	slots	would	necessarily	be	undifferentiated;	some	of	them	could	be	‘sensitive’	to	the	nature	of	the	properties	that	can	fill	them.	So,		Newton’s	gravitational	law	and	Coulomb’s	electrostatic	law	are	both	inverse-square	dynamical	laws	(they	have	the	same	functional	form),	but,	nevertheless,	we	could	say	that	the	nomic	relations	associated	with	those	two	laws	were	different.	This,	in	turn,	means	that	a	nomic	relation	is	inter	alia	sensitive	to	the	nature	of	its	relata	and	that	fact	
is	revealed	by	its	relata-specificity.	In	effect,	this	answer	rejects	the	foregoing	intuition:	
																																																						12	As	Weiland	and	Betti	(2008)	note,	the	relata-specificity	of	first-order	relations	can	explain	the	unity	that	characterises	first-order	states	of	affairs.	Perhaps	then	the	relata-specificity	of	second-order	nomic	relations	can	explain	the	unity	of	nomic	facts.	13	In	order	to	avoid	misunderstandings,	we	should	make	clear	that	according	to	the	dualist	model	(whose	main	 tenets	we	outline	here)	 laws	do	not	govern	 the	behaviour	of	properties	via	 their	 [i.e.	properties’]	powers.	If	that	were	the	case,	then	the	proposed	model	would	not	be	explanatorily	superior	to	LP	theories	regarding	the	Governing	Problem	because	it	(like	LP	accounts)	would	also	invite	the	question	of	how	laws	manage	to	govern	properties	which,	 in	this	case,	are	or	have	(thin)	powers.	 In	our	view,	however,	 laws	govern	properties	by	having	as	ontological	constituents	relata-specific	nomic	relations.	Nevertheless,	thin	powers	are	needed	to	ensure	properties’	nomic	governability,	that	is,	properties’	capability	to	enter	into	nomic	relations.	
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laws	which	involve	a	nomic	relation	with	the	same	functional	form	are	different	if	the	relata	are	different.		Alternatively,	we	could	modify	the	criterion	of	relata-specificity	in	order	to	respect	the	foregoing	intuition,	viz.	that	the	‘inverse-square-of-the-distance’	nomic	relation	is	the	same	in	the	two	laws,	the	only	difference	being	that	the	relata	are	different.	According	to	the	original	definition	of	relata-specificity	noted	above,	a	relation	R	is	relata-specific	iff	it	relates	unique	and	fully	specific	relata	as	soon	as	it	exists.	According	to	the	modified	account	of	relata-specificity	a	relata-specific	relation	need	not	relate	just	one	n-tuple	of	relata,	but	one	kind	of	relata	with	a	certain	thin	power,	e.g.,	attractivity.	If	that’s	plausible,	then	the	same	nomic	relation	(e.g.,	the	‘inverse-square-of-the-distance’	relation)	can	relate	distinct	properties	with	the	same	thin	power	(e.g.,	masses	with	masses	and	charges	with	charges).	A	plausible	view	about	the	‘relata-specificity’	of	a	nomic	relation	is	that	it	concerns	some	specific	thin	power	of	the	related	properties.	Mass,	for	instance,	may	have	the	power	to	attract	mass.	If	that	is	true,	then	mass	can	enter	into	relations	with	other	masses	in	such	a	way	that	its	attractive	power	is	manifested.	But	since	charges	have	also	the	power	to	attract	other	charges,	there	is	no	reason	not	to	suppose	that	the	actual	nomic	relation	which,	contingently,	relates	masses	with	distance	and	force	is	the	same	as	the	relation	which,	contingently,	relates	charges	with	distance	and	force.		We	don’t	have	to	commit	ourselves	to	one	of	the	two	replies	to	the	slot	objection,	because	for	us	the	important	point	is	that	whatever	view	is	adopted	the	laws	do	not	become	metaphysically	necessary.	Whichever	way	we	think	of	relata-specificity,	if	a	relation	is	relata-specific	and	holds	between	P	and	Q	in	the	actual	world,	it	holds	between	P	and	Q	in	all	possible	worlds	in	which	the	relation	exists,	but	not	necessarily	in	any	possible	world	in	which	P	and	Q	exist,	or	in	any	possible	world	whatsoever.	The	relata	of	a	relata-specific	relation	exist	independently	of	the	relation.	So,	the	relata	need	not	be	related	by	the	specific	nomic	relation.	That	is,	there	are	possible	worlds	in	which	the	relata	exist	yet	the	nomic	relation	does	not.	Hence,	nomic	relations,	qua	relata-specific,	are	metaphysically	contingent.	Hence,	the	laws	are	metaphysically	contingent.	But	at	the	same	time,	the	relata,	having	certain	thin	powers,	can	enter	into	certain	kinds	of	relations.	Consider,	for	instance,	the	second-order	fact	that	is	Newton’s	gravitation	law.	This	fact,	in	the	actual	world,	involves	the	property	of	mass	and	the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	nomic	relation.	Given	that	mass	has	only	a	thin	power,	masses	could	relate	to	each	other	by	different	nomic	relations;	but	given	that	mass	does	have	this	minimal	power	to	attract	other	masses,	they	would	necessarily	be	related	by	a	certain	‘attractive’	kind	of	relation.	The	nomic	fact	that	is	Newton’s	gravitation	law	must	involve	a	nomic	relation	between	specific	thin	powerful	properties.	In	a	different	possible	world,	the	nomic	relation	(the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	relation)	could	be	different,	but	given	that	it	involves	masses	in	the	actual	world,	and	masses	have	minimal	power,	the	law	would	be	an	attractive	one.	We	may	summarise	our	account	in	a	series	of	short	answers	to	four	important	questions.			First,	how	do	laws	govern	properties?		Answer:	a	law	governs	a	specific	property	by	having	a	constituent—a	nomic	relation—which	determines	the	specific	form	of	the	second-order	relation	that	this	property	bears	to	other	properties.			
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Second,	why	does	a	nomic	relation	relate	(and	hence	govern)	the	properties	that	it	actually	relates	and	not	others?		Answer:	because	it	is	by	its	own	nature	relata-specific.			Third,	why	should	properties	have	(or,	be)	thin	powers?		Answer:	because	they	must	have	a	minimal	modal	nature	in	order	to	be	apt	to	be	related	by	nomic	relations.			Fourth,	why	should	one	accept	DM	given	that	it	is	less	parsimonious	compared	to	monistic	views	such	as	dispositionalism	or	primitivism?		Answer:	while	parsimony	is	certainly	a	virtue	in	metaphysics,	less	parsimonious	views	are	to	be	preferred	to	the	extent	that	they	solve	problems	that	more	parsimonious	alternatives	are	not	able	to	solve.	We	have	argued	that	this	is	in	fact	the	case	for	all	main	monistic	accounts	that	accept	either	laws	or	powers,	but	not	both,	as	fundamental	elements	in	ontology.	So,	while	less	parsimonious,	the	richer	ontology	of	DM	enables	it	to	offer	an	account	of	the	ontology	of	laws	that,	we	claim,	it	is	more	consonant	with	the	scientific	image	as	revealed	by	current	science,	and	the	metaphysical	picture	that	underpins	it,	than	any	of	its	monistic	rivals.			 This,	then,	is	in	broad	outline	the	metaphysically	deflationary	view	we	associate	with	DM.14	It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	to	develop	a	complete	account	of	laws	of	nature	as	understood	by	DM.	The	important	point	to	note	here	is	that,	in	contrast	to	current	monistic	views	about	laws	(such	as	PL	and	LP),	we	take	it	that	the	very	idea	that	laws	govern	worldly	regularities	requires	a	commitment	to	both	laws	and	powers	as	distinct	and	irreducible	elements,	which	indispensably	contribute	to	fixing	the	nomological	structure	of	the	world.	According	to	DM,	the	specific	behaviours	of	things	in	the	world	are	the	outcome	of	both	the	thin	powers	things	have	to	be	subjected	to	laws,	and	certain	nomic	features	of	the	world	(including	symmetries	and	conservation	laws).	So	the	motto	of	DM	is:	no	laws	and	(thin)	powers	in,	no	(governing)	laws	out.		 		
6	Other	Accounts	that	Combine	Powers	and	Laws	DM	is	not	the	only	theoretical	proposal	that	tries	to	combine	modal	properties	and	laws.	In	order	to	further	strengthen	the	plausibility	of	DM,	let	us	in	this	last	section	examine	some	such	recent	accounts.	Since	our	focus	is	on	governing	laws	we	will	not	discuss	those	views	that	suggest	that	we	can	combine	realism	about	modal	properties	with	versions	of	regularity	theory	of	non-governing	laws	(see	Vetter	(2015,	289–290)	and	Demarest	(2017)).		Kistler	(forthcoming)	thinks	that	powers	and	laws	together	play	the	metaphysical	role	of	making	true	disposition	attributions.	He	takes	it	that	the	justification	of	his	view	is	that	it	offers	the	best	way	to	make	sense	of	what	science	says	about	the	dispositions	of	objects.	In	particular,	Kistler	argues	that	laws	are	indispensable	in	making	sense	of	what	science	tells	us	about	dispositions	for	two	reasons:	first,	laws	are	required	to	explain	the	structure	of	the	dispositions	corresponding	to	one	power	and	to	make	sense	of	the	systematic	relations	between	the	dispositions	of	different	powers.	And	second,	laws	provide	the	relational	part	of	the	truthmaker	of	a	disposition	ascription	which	
																																																						14	The	suggested	account	 is	metaphysically	deflationary	 in	 the	sense	that	 it	does	not	posit	a	sui	generis	governing	relation.	It	is	important	to	stress	that	the	discussion	concerns	the	governing	of	the	behaviour	of	properties,	 not	 of	 objects.	 The	 latter	 is	 intimately	 related	 to	 (or	 even	 identified	 with)	 the	 relation	 of	necessitation	of	natural	regularities	by	laws	(see,	for	example,	Hildebrand	2013).	
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cannot	be	offered	by	monadic	powers.	For	Kistler,	laws	must	be	ontologically	robust	for	them	to	be	truthmakers.	One	way	to	fulfil	this	requirement	is	to	think	of	laws	(as	Kistler	does)	as	B-internal	relations	between	properties,15	that	is,	internal	relations	whose	relata	are	partly	or	wholly	constituted	by	their	entering	into	these	relations.		Kistler’s	account	seems	to	be	akin	to	the	dualist	model	since	both	powers	and	laws	are	required	to	metaphysically	explain	the	dispositions	of	objects.	Yet,	secunda	facie,	this	is	not	the	case	because	Kistler	adopts	neutral	monism	about	properties;	that	is,	he	thinks	that	the	categorical/dispositional	distinction	is	not	ontological	and	refers	to	different	ways	of	conceiving	and/or	describing	natural	properties.	The	term	‘power’	refers	according	to	Kistler	to	any	property	that	is	a	partial	truthmaker	for	a	disposition	ascription.	Kistler’s	neutral	monism	is	the	basis	for	our	main	worry	about	his	position.	It	is	true	that	according	to	both	his	view	and	the	dualist	model	natural	properties	and	laws	are	needed	to	explain	the	order	that	characterises	the	actual	world.	Our	model,	however,	can	metaphysically	explain	the	need	for	laws;	since	natural	properties	are	by	their	nature	modally	too	thin	to	do	the	explanatory	job	by	themselves,	laws	are	required	to	provide	the	‘missing’	modality.	We	cannot	see,	however,	how	Kistler’s	account	can	metaphysically	explain	the	indispensability	of	laws.	In	line	with	his	neutral	monism,	he	cannot	say	that	natural	properties	have	a	dispositional	or	categorical	or	‘mixed’	nature.	Hence,	it	is	an	ontological	brute	fact16	that	they	are	only	partial	truthmakers	of	the	disposition	ascriptions.	Scientific	practice	shows	that	laws	are	an	indispensable	element	of	any	adequate	explanation	of	the	behaviour	and	the	dispositions	of	objects,	but	there	is	nothing	in	Kistler’s	neutral	monistic	account	that	could	metaphysically	explain	that.			In	contrast	to	Kistler,	Tugby	holds	that	properties	have	a	powerful	nature.	In	his	(2016),	he	defends	the	indispensability	of	governing	laws	in	the	framework	of	a	power-based	ontology.	According	to	Tugby,	the	motivation	to	discuss	seriously	the	role	of	substantial	nomic	relations	in	a	powers	ontology	is	that	the	relational-constitution	view	about	powers	is	structurally	similar	to	the	ADT	view	as	far	as	the	governance	of	the	behaviour	of	concrete	things	is	concerned.	More	precisely,	in	both	views	second-order	relations	between	property	types	help	to	explain	the	behaviour	of	propertied	things.	Of	course,	the	difference	is	that	the	second-order	relations	between	power	types	are	internal	and	necessary,	whereas	ADT	nomic	relations	are	external	and	contingent.	Yet,	the	latter	fact	would	have	an	impact	on	the	similarity	between	the	views	only	provided	that	the	nomic	relations	between	power	types,	qua	internal,	were	no	additions	of	being.	Tugby	argues,	however,	that	qua	B-internal,	nomic	relations	are	metaphysically	robust	(2016,	1152).	So,	in	Tugby’s	view,	power	theorists	face	their	own	inference	problem	and	in	order	to	solve	it	they	have	to	investigate	the	role	of	second-order	nomic	relations	between	powers	in	the	governance	of	concrete	things.	Tugby	argues	that	power	types	are	Platonic	entities	which	are	essentially	constituted	by	B-internal	second-order	nomic	relations.	The	latter,	though	necessary	and	internal,	are	external	to	the	concrete	things	because	a)	qua	Platonic	are	capable	of	uninstantiated	existence,	and	b)	the	first	order	states	of	affairs	which	are	their	instances	ontologically	depend	on	them	and	not	vice	versa.	For	Tugby,	this	kind	of	externality	is	a	necessary	condition	for	these	relations	to	govern.	Now,	power	types,	though	capable	of	uninstantiated	existence,	are	often	instantiated	by	concrete	things.	Tugby	defends	an	
																																																						15	Here	we	follow	Barker’s	(2009)	terminology	for	the	different	kinds	of	internal	relations.	16	Kistler	argues	that	since	the	ascription	of	a	disposition	is	a	relational	fact,	its	truthmaker	should	have	a	relational	part	(which,	for	him,	is	the	law).	The	ontological	structure	of	a	truthmaker,	however,	does	not	have	to	mirror	the	structure	of	its	associated	truth.		





																																																						17	What	determines	this	possibility?	The	dispositional	nature	of	modal	properties	or	 independent	 laws?	What	 kind	 of	 possibility	 is	 this?	 If	 it	 is	 physical,	 we	 probably	 have	 a	 circularity	 here.	 Alien	 properties	should	 be	 physically	 possible	 in	 order	 to	 figure	 in	 cp	 clauses	 but	 the	 latter	 delimit	 the	 range	 of	disposition-manifestation	 and	 so,	 according	 to	 power	 realists’	 own	 lights,	 determine	 the	 physically	possible	events.	
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cp	clauses	help	to	delimit	the	range	of	possible	disposition-manifestations	and	function	as	(at	least	partial)	truthmakers	for	various	counterfactuals	concerning	the	manifestations	of	those	dispositions.	Therefore,	they	contribute	to	the	fact	that	events	in	our	world	must	take	place	in	certain	ways	rather	than	others.	Dumsday	(2019,	14)	explains:	“If	an	uninstantiated	value	of	positive	charge	were	instantiated	in	entities	possessing	mass,	then	where	those	entities	would	normally	undergo	a	gravitational	attraction	of	a	certain	force,	they	might	instead	be	repelled.	Or	if	an	alien	universal	were	instantiated,	the	‘normal’	disposition	manifestation	might	otherwise	be	disrupted.	Even	in	their	uninstantiated	state,	these	universals	serve	as	truthmakers	for	counterfactuals	involving	actual,	instantiated	dispositions.	This	counts	as	playing	a	governing	role	in	the	physical	universe,	in	the	relevant	sense…”.	Cp	clauses	then	‘include’	abstracta	determining	that	certain	events	can	or	cannot	take	place	under	particular	circumstances.	But	for	Dumsday	laws	are	properly	conceived	as	abstract	entities	somehow	playing	a	governing	role	in	the	physical	universe.	Hence,	cp	clauses	(by	incorporating	abstracta	that	do	exactly	that)	should	be	laws.			There	is	a	number	of	objections	about	nomic	dispositionalism	(ND),	some	of	which	Dumsday	himself	is	at	pains	to	meet.	The	first	objection	is	that	the	account	of	laws	given	by	ND	is	divorced	from	typical	scientific	usage.	According	to	ND,	laws	of	nature	are	not	what	scientists	typically	call	laws	but	are	instead	the	cp	clauses	figuring	in	the	identity	conditions	of	those	modal	properties	that	appear	in	scientific	laws.	Dumsday	(2019,	21)	admits	that	this	a	disadvantage	for	his	view	but	points	out	that	ND	is	closer	to	scientific	use	of	law-talk	than	traditional	realism	about	modal	properties	because	in	contrast	to	the	latter	it	allows	some	robust	governing	laws	to	exist.	This	response	is	hardly	adequate	because	the	problem	is	not	whether	ND	is	better	than	traditional	realism	about	modal	properties	but	rather	whether	cp	clauses	can	be	regarded	by	scientists	as	law-statements	(we	take	it	that	Dumsday	view	is	that	cp	clauses	are	law	statements	that	correspond	to	abstract	entities	that	govern).	For	scientists,	however,	the	typical	expression	of	a	law-statement	is	a	functional	relation	between	physical	properties	and	not	a	cp	clause.	So,	if	we	want	to	have	a	metaphysics	of	laws	that	is	friendly	to	scientific	practice	(as	Dumsday	advertises	his	view),	we	should	refrain	from	adopting	views	which	are	so	remote	from	what	scientists	believe	that	actual	laws	are.	This	is	then	a	main	difference	between	ND	and	the	dualist	model	that	strongly	counts	in	favour	on	the	latter,	since	in	DM,	governing	laws	have	exactly	the	form	of	laws	as	revealed	by	science.	A	second	objection	against	ND	is	that	cp	clauses	cannot	be	governing	laws	because	they	cannot	govern	the	behaviour	of	worldly	things.	The	reason	for	being	unable	to	govern	is	that	cp	clauses	are	existentially	dependent	on	their	associated	modal	properties	of	things	and	nothing	seems	to	be	able	to	govern	what	is	existentially	dependent	on.	The	existential	dependence	of	cp	clauses	is	due	to	the	fact	that	they	are	parts	of	the	identity	conditions	of	dispositions	associated	with	modal	properties	of	things	(2019,	15).	Dumsday’s	response	is	that	the	uninstantiated	universals	figuring	in	a	cp	clause	associated	with	a	modal	property	cannot	be	literally	constituents	of	an	
instance	of	that	property.	For	him,	what	is	really	happening	is	that	an	instance	of	a	modal	property	has	an	extrinsic	necessary	relation	to	these	universals	and	that	does	not	rule	out	that	one	relatum	of	the	relation	can	govern	the	other	one.	It	is	not	clear,	however,	whether	there	can	exist	a	governing	relation	between	different	levels	(the	type-level	of	uninstantiated	universals	and	the	token-level	of	property-instance)	that	is	not	the	instantiation	relation	(if	the	latter	exists).	And	even	if	we	skip	this	difficulty,	it	seems	that	Dumsday’s	response	fails	to	capture	what	the	objection	really	is.	For	cp	clauses	are	involved	in	the	identity	conditions	of	property-
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